I wanna hold your Dead Hand
Remember the Soviet Doomsday Machine in Dr Strangelove? Well, the Soviets actually built one. Not exactly the same, but as terrifying -- and it might be still around.
Picture, if you will, a surprise attack by NATO against Russia with nuclear missiles secretly deployed in Finland. In just seven minutes, Moscow is turned into a radioactive wasteland, millions are killed, and all Russian leaders are eliminated before they are able to react. In the Collective West, rabid warmongers celebrate wildly, while decent people are horrified. But at least we took out those damn Ruskies, right?
Right?
Everything’s ruined
A couple of hours later, something extraordinary happens.
Russian nuclear missiles rise from their silos and cross the vast expanses of the country, automatically “awakening”, with radio signals, all Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) that are still operational, and sending them to strike the United States and its NATO allies.
It’s over. The Dead Hand has struck.
A real Doomsday Machine
The Perimeter, also known as Dead Hand (Мертвая рука), was a Soviet nuclear system completed in 1985. Perimeter was designed to launch a nuclear retaliation in the event of a large-scale nuclear attack that would have incapacitated the USSR's leadership (technically the Dead Hand and Perimeter were not exactly the same, but for all practical purposes they go together).
Why “Dead Hand”? Because the hand that would push the button would be, well, dead.
This looks like coming straight from Dr Strangelove. There, the Doomsday Machine is automatically triggered as soon as a rogue bomber launches a nuclear weapon on the USSR. And the world ends at the same time as the film.
But there’s a detail that makes all the difference in the world. The Dead Hand was semiautomatic. Someone should turn it on after confirming that the country’s leadership had been vaporized, following a number of steps to reach that conclusion.
Off with their heads
David Hoffman’s book The Dead Hand offers a detailed account of how and why the Perimeter system was built in the 80s. His investigative work, that won him a Pulitzer Prize, was greatly helped by his interviews with Valery Yarynich, a Soviet officer who played an important part in the development of the Dead Hand.
The fear of “decapitation” of the Soviet leadership — which sometimes bordered on paranoia — was widespread in the power elite. But it became much more acute in 1984. On February 13, Konstantin Chernenko, the next in line after Yuri Andropov’s death, was inaugurated as the country’s leader. Andropov, in his last moments, had left a letter determining that his successor should be his protégé, a man called Mikhail Gorbachev (you might have heard of him). But the Communist Party establishment ignored it. It didn’t go well.
Dead man walking
The problem with Chernenko is that he was dying. Terminally ill with emphysema, unable to read speeches (even when provided with cue cards), trembling, stumbling, he was there only for bureaucratic reasons. His tenure lasted just a bit more than one year — he met his maker on March 10, 1985.
So the key question was: can we entrust this clearly infirm leader with the decision to launch nuclear weapons? Would he even be able to understand what was going on? It was in this tense political climate that the Perimeter, which was being slowly developed since the 70s, was finalized, tested, and put on combat-ready status in January 1985.
Three steps to Armageddon
The system would be turned on by officers in an underground command centre deep in the Urals. It was not fully automatic because, come to think of it, it would be crazy to have computers in charge of all decisions (remember WOPR from WarGames?).
The officers should go through the following steps:
(1) Was the system activated by the Kremlin?
If yes, an attack is officially authorized. Check (2)
(2) Is it possible to contact the leadership for confirmation?
If not, it means that contact is lost and the hand is dead. Check (3)
(3) Is there evidence of a nuclear attack?
If yes, launch the damn thing and be done with it.
What kind of evidence could be provided? Things are somewhat murky here. A network of sensors was supposed to collect a host of data about seismic activity, radioactivity, pressure, light, and other indicators of a nuclear attack. There are not too many details (the above description is adapted from Hoffman’s book). Anyway, let’s suppose all three steps were taken. Now it’s launch time.
Is there anybody out there?
In the early 70s the Soviet General Staff started to investigate how to develop a system of “guaranteed retaliation”, in case there was a breakdown in communication due to a nuclear attack. Ultimately, the idea was to have missiles equipped with very potent and highly secure radio transmitters to send the launch orders to any ICBM that might be still available (for the history and technical details, see here and here).
After the three steps mentioned above were checked, the officers in the underground command centre would send the missiles to fly over the USSR for around thirty minutes, issuing the commands to launch the remaining intercontinental missiles. It is estimated that in 1985 the USSR had around 1,500 ICBMs, carrying 6,000 warheads. The explosive yield was much higher than today (after more than 30 years of arms reduction treaties), with a total of around 3,500 megatons (3.5 billion tons of TNT).
This means that unless the US managed to destroy many hundreds of Soviet nuclear silos, the response would be devastating. Perimeter would launch everything and the kitchen sink towards America and NATO centres in Europe. It would be very unpleasant indeed.
Let them know
Yarynich started having second thoughts about Perimeter after it was in place. He couldn’t understand the secrecy around the system. And his argument was the same as the one made by Dr Strangelove to the Soviet ambassador in the classic film: what is the point of having something like this if your opponent doesn’t know? The whole point of deterrence — preventing them from attacking — is lost.
In the final days of the Soviet Union, Yarynich gave a few details of the system to the American Bruce Blair (a former Minuteman nuclear missile launch officer), who at that time worked for the Brookings Institution and was researching Soviet command and control. They became friends, and in October 1993 Blair published an op-ed in the New York Times, revealing the Doomsday Machine to the world. It was followed by another article in February 1994, by Yarynich, in which he offered more detailed information.
We couldn’t work it out
Until his death in 2012, Yarynich campaigned for transparency between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding their command and control systems — he believed this would be the best deterrent. It didn’t happen, of course (and it was quite unrealistic).
He also defended that nuclear missiles should not be on “hair-trigger alert”, always ready to launch. They still are. And it doesn’t look like this is going to change, especially now.
Better safe than sorry
Is the Doomsday Machine still around? Nobody (besides the Russian political and military leadership) knows. The system was allegedly withdrawn from combat readiness in 1995. Speculation is rampant though, and with the war raging in Ukraine, many people wonder if the Dead Hand might rise from the grave in case NATO is reckless enough to launch a nuclear attack (extremely unlikely, at least for now).
However, in December 2011, when asked about the system, Sergei Karakaev, commander of the Strategic Missile forces, had this to say:
“Perimeter exists. The system is on alert duty. If there is a need for a retaliatory strike, when it is impossible to bring a signal to the part of the launchers, this command can come from these missiles.”
There you have it: your deterrent for everyone. But was he telling the truth or just bluffing? Do we really want to know?